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This paper studies the estimation of dynamic discrete games of incomplete information.
Two main econometric issues appear in the estimation of these models: the indeterminacy
problem associated with the existence of multiple equilibria, and the computational burden in
the solution of the game. We propose a class of pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) estimators
that deals with these problems and we study the asymptotic and ﬁnite sample properties of
several estimators in this class. We ﬁrst focus on two-step PML estimators which, though
attractive for their computational simplicity, have some important limitations: they are seriously
biased in small samples; they require consistent nonparametric estimators of players’ choice
probabilities in the ﬁrst step, which are not always feasible for some models and data; and
they are asymptotically ineﬃcient. Second, we show that a recursive extension of the two-step
PML, which we call nested pseudo likelihood (NPL), addresses those drawbacks at a relatively
small additional computational cost. The NPL estimator is particularly useful in applications
where consistent nonparametric estimates of choice probabilities are either not available or very
imprecise, e.g., models with permanent unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we illustrate these
methods in Montecarlo experiments and in an empirical application to a model of ﬁrm entry
and exit in oligopoly markets using Chilean data from several retail industries.
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assistance.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Empirical discrete games are useful tools in the analysis of economic and social phenomena whenever
strategic interactions are an important aspect of individual behavior. The range of applications
includes, among others, models of market entry (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990 and 1991b, Berry,
1992, Toivanen and Waterson, 2000), models of spatial competition (Seim, 2000), release timing
of motion pictures (Einav, 2003, and Zhang-Foutz and Kadiyali, 2003), intra-family allocations
(Kooreman, 1994, Engers and Stern, 2002), and models with social interactions (Brock and Durlauf,
2001). Although dynamic considerations are potentially relevant in some of these studies, most
applications of empirical discrete games have estimated static models. Two main econometric issues
have limited the scope of applications to relatively simple static games: the computational burden
in the solution of dynamic discrete games, and the indeterminacy problem associated with the
existence of multiple equilibria. This paper studies these issues in the context of a class of dynamic
discrete games of incomplete information and develops techniques for the estimation of structural
parameters. The rest of this introductory section discusses previous work in this literature and
describes the contribution of this paper.
The existence of multiple equilibria is a prevalent feature in most empirical games where best
response functions are non-linear in other players’ actions. Models with multiple equilibria do not
have a unique reduced form and this incompleteness may pose practical and theoretical problems
in the estimation of structural parameters. In particular, maximum likelihood and other extremum
estimators require that we obtain all the equilibria for every trial value of the parameters. This
can be unfeasible even for simple models. The most common approach to deal with this problem
has been to impose restrictions which guarantee equilibrium uniqueness for any possible value of
the structural parameters. For instance, if strategic interactions among players have a recursive
structure, the equilibrium is unique (see Heckman, 1978). A similar but less restrictive approach
has been used by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) in the context of empirical games of market
entry. These authors consider a speciﬁcation where a ﬁrm’s proﬁt depends on the number of ﬁrms
operating in the market but not on the identity of these ﬁrms. Under this condition, the equilibrium
number of entrants is invariant over the multiple equilibria. Based on this property, Bresnahan and
Reiss propose an estimator that maximizes a likelihood for the number of entrants. Though this
can be a useful approach for some applications, it rules out interesting cases like models where
ﬁrms have heterogeneous production costs or where they produce diﬀerentiated products. Notice
also that these restrictions are not necessary for the identiﬁcation of the model (see Tamer, 2003).1
1In general, a unique reduced form is neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition for identiﬁcation (Jovanovic,
1989).
1Computational costs in the solution and estimation of these models have also limited the range
of empirical applications to static models with a relatively small number of players and choice
alternatives. Equilibria are ﬁxed points of the system of best response operators, and in dynamic
games each player’s best response is itself the solution to a discrete choice dynamic programming
problem. There is a curse of dimensionality in the sense that the cost of computing an equilibrium
increases exponentially with the number of players. Furthermore, the standard nested ﬁxed-point
algorithms used to estimate single agent dynamic models and static games require the repeated
solution of the model for each trial value of the vector of parameters to estimate. Therefore, the
cost of estimating these models using those algorithms is much larger than the cost of solving the
model just once.
This paper considers a class of pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) estimators that deals with
these problems and studies the asymptotic and ﬁnite sample properties of these estimators. The
method of PML was ﬁrst proposed by Gong and Samaniego (1981) to deal with the problem of
incidental parameters. In general, PML estimation consists of replacing all nuisance parameters in
a model by estimates and solving a system of likelihood equations for the parameters of interest.
This idea has been previously used in the estimation of dynamic structural econometric models
by Hotz and Miller (1993) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002). Here we show that this technique
is particularly useful in the estimation of dynamic games of incomplete information with multiple
equilibria and large state spaces.
Our PML estimators are based on a representation of Markov perfect equilibria as ﬁxed points
of a best response mapping in the space of players’ choice probabilities. These probabilities are
interpreted as players’ beliefs about the behavior of their opponents. Given these beliefs, one
can interpret each player’s problem as a game against nature with a unique optimal decision rule
in probability space, which is the player’s best response. While equilibrium probabilities are not
unique functions of structural parameters, the best response mapping is always a unique function of
structural parameters and players’ beliefs about the behavior of other players. We use these best re-
sponse functions to construct a pseudo likelihood function and obtain a PML estimator of structural
parameters. If the pseudo likelihood function is based on a consistent nonparametric estimator of
players’ beliefs, we get a two-step PML estimator that is consistent and asymptotically normal. The
main advantage of this estimator is its computational simplicity. However, it has three important
limitations. First, it is asymptotically ineﬃcient because its asymptotic variance depends on the
variance of the initial nonparametric estimator. Second and more important, the nonparametric
estimator can be very imprecise in the small samples available in actual applications, and this can
generate serious ﬁnite sample biases in the two-step estimator of structural parameters. And third,
2consistent nonparametric estimators of players’ choice probabilities are not always feasible for some
models and data. These limitations motivate a recursive extension of the two-step PML that we
call nested pseudo likelihood estimator (NPL). We show that the NPL estimator addresses these
drawbacks of the two-step PML at a relatively small additional computational cost. We illustrate
the performance of these estimators in the context of an actual application and in Monte Carlo
experiments based on a model of market entry and exit.
There has been an increasing interest in the estimation of discrete games during the last years,
which has generated several methodological papers on this topic. Pesendorfer and Schmidt (2003)
propose a two stage method that is equivalent to our two-step estimator when it is initialized
with consistent nonparametric estimates. Pakes, Ostrowsky and Berry (2003) consider the same
estimator, and combine it also with simulation methods. We compare the performance of this
estimator with the NPL in our Monte Carlo experiments. Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003)
show that the simulation-based estimator in Hotz, Miller, Saunders and Smith (1994) can be
applied to estimate dynamic models of imperfect competition with both discrete and continuous
decision variables. For the case of static games with complete information, Tamer (2003) presents
suﬃcient conditions for the identiﬁcation of a two-player model and proposes a pseudo maximum
likelihood estimation method. Tamer (2004) extends this approach to static games with N players.
Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) study also the identiﬁcation of normal form games with complete
information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the class of models considered in
this paper and the basic assumptions. Section 3 explains the problems associated with maximum
likelihood estimation, presents the two-step PML and the NPL estimators, and describes their
properties. Section 4 presents several Monte Carlo experiments. Section 5 illustrates these methods
with the estimation of a model of market entry-exit using actual panel data of Chilean ﬁrms. We
conclude and summarize in section 6. Proofs of diﬀerent results are provided in the Appendix.
2 A dynamic discrete game
This section presents a dynamic discrete game with incomplete information similar to the one in
Rust (1994, pp. 154-158). In order to make some of the discussions less abstract, we consider
am o d e lw h e r eﬁrms competing in a local retail market decide the number of their outlets. A
model of market entry-exit is a particular case of this framework. Although we do not deal with
estimation and econometric issues until section 3, it is useful to anticipate the type of data that we
have in mind. We consider a researcher who observes many geographically separate markets such
3as (non-metropolitan) small cities or towns. The game is played at the level of individual markets.
The number and the identity of the players can vary across markets. Examples of applications with
this type of data are Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) for car dealers, Berry (1992) for airlines, Toivanen
and Waterson (2000) for fast-food restaurants, De Juan (2001) for banks, Netz and Taylor (2002)
for gas stations, Seim (2000) for video rental stores, or Ellickson (2003) for supermarkets.
2.1 Framework and basic assumptions
Each market is characterized by demand conditions which can change over time (e.g., population,
income and age distribution, etc). Let dt be the vector of demand shifters at period t.T h e r ea r e
N ﬁrms operating in the market, which we index by i ∈ I = {1,2,...,N}. At every discrete period
t ﬁrms decide simultaneously how many outlets to operate. Proﬁts are bounded from above such
that the maximum number of outlets, J,i sﬁnite. Therefore, a ﬁrm’s set of choice alternatives is
A = {0,1,...,J}, which is discrete and ﬁnite. We represent the decision of ﬁrm i at period t by the
variable ait ∈ A.
At the beginning of period t a ﬁrm is characterized by two vectors of state variables which
aﬀect its proﬁtability: xit and εit.V a r i a b l e s i n xit are common knowledge for all ﬁrms in the
market, but the vector εit is private information of ﬁrm i. For instance, some variables which
could enter in xit are the ﬁrm’s number of outlets at the previous period or the years of experience
of the ﬁrm in the market. Managerial ability at diﬀerent outlets could be a component of εit.
Let xt ≡ (dt,x 1t,x 2t,...,x Nt) and εt ≡ (ε1t,ε 2t,...,ε Nt) be the vectors of common knowledge and
private information variables, respectively. A ﬁrm’s current proﬁts depend on xt,o ni t so w n
private information εit, and on the vector of ﬁrms’ current decisions, at ≡ (a1t,a 2t,...,a Nt).L e t
˜ Πi(at,x t,ε it) be ﬁrm i’s current proﬁt function. We assume that {xt,ε t} follows a controlled
Markov process with transition probability p(xt+1,ε t+1|at,x t,ε t). This transition probability is
common knowledge.





βs−t ˜ Πi(as,x s,ε is) | xt,ε it
)
(1)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. The primitives of the model are the proﬁt functions
{˜ Πi(.):i =1 ,2,...N}, the transition probability p(.|.), and the discount factor β. We consider the
following assumptions on these primitives.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Additive separability): Private information appears additively in the proﬁt func-
tion. That is, ˜ Πi(at,x t,ε it)=Πi(at,x t)+εit(ait),w h e r eΠi(.) is a real valued function, and
εit ≡ {εit(0),ε it(1),...,ε it(J)} ∈ RJ+1 is a vector of real valued random variables.
4ASSUMPTION 2 (Conditional independence): The transition probability p(.|.) factors as: p(xt+1,ε t+1|
at,x t,ε t)=pε(εt+1) f(xt+1 | at,x t). T h a ti s : ( 1 )g i v e nﬁrms’ decisions at period t,p r i v a t ei n -
formation variables do not aﬀect the transition of common knowledge variables; and (2) private
information variables are independently and identically distributed over time.
ASSUMPTION 3 (Independent private values): Private information is independently distributed
across players: pε(εt)=
QN
i=1 gi(εit), where, for any player i, gi(.) is a density function which is
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
ASSUMPTION 4 (Discrete common knowledge variables): Common knowledge variables have a
discrete and ﬁnite support: xt ∈ X ≡ {x1,x 2,...,x |X|} where |X|is a ﬁnite number.
Example (Entry and exit in a local retail market): Suppose the players are supermarkets making
decisions on whether to open, continuing to operate or closing their stores. The market is a small
city and a supermarket has at most one store in this market, i.e., ait ∈ {0,1}.I f a s u p e r m a r k e t
does not operate a store, it gets zero proﬁts. Opening a new store requires a sunk entry cost α2.
If the supermarket operates a store, its proﬁts depend on: (1) the state of the local economy (e.g.,
population, income, unemployment rate, etc), which is captured by the vector of demand shifters
dt; (2) the store’s years of experience in this market, represented by the variable cit;( 3 )t h en u m b e r
of ﬁrms operating in this market; (4) the average experience of other ﬁrms in this market; and (5)
ap r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o ns h o c kεit. Current proﬁts of an active store are:













where α0, α1, α2, α3, δ1 and δ1 are parameters. In particular, the parameters δ1 and δ2 capture
the existence of strategic interactions. The set of common knowledge state variables consists of
the demographic variables in dt, the decisions at previous period, and the years of experience of all
supermarkets.
2.2 Strategies and Bellman equations
The game has a Markov structure, and we assume that ﬁrms play (stationary) Markov strategies.
That is, if {xt,ε it} = {xs,ε is} then ﬁrm i0sd e c i s i o n sa tp e r i o d st and s are the same. Therefore,
we can omit the time subindex and use x0 and ε0 to denote next period state variables. Let σ =
{σi(x,εi)} be a set of strategy functions or decision rules, one for each ﬁrm, with σi : X×RJ+1 → A.
Associated with a set of strategy functions σ we can deﬁne a set of conditional choice probabilities
Pσ = {Pσ
i (ai|x)} such that,
Pσ
i (ai|x) ≡ Pr(σi(x,εi)=ai |x)=
Z
I {σi(x,εi)=ai} gi(εi) dεi (3)
5where I{.}is the indicator function. The probabilities {Pσ
i (ai|x):ai ∈ A} represent the expected
behavior of ﬁrm i from the point of view of the rest of the ﬁrms when ﬁrm i follows its strategy in
σ.
Let πσ
i (ai,x) be ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt if it chooses alternative ai and the other ﬁrms behave













Let ˜ V σ
i (x,εi)be the value of ﬁrm i if this ﬁrm behaves optimally now and in the future given that
the other ﬁrms follow their strategies in σ. By Bellman’s principle of optimality, we can write:
˜ V σ



















i (x0|x,ai) is the transition probability of x conditional on ﬁrm i choosing ai and the other













It is convenient to deﬁne value functions integrated over private information variables. Let
V σ
i (x) be the integrated value function
R ˜ V σ
i (x,εi) g(dεi). Based on this deﬁnition and equation















The right hand side of equation (7) is a contraction mapping in the space of value functions (see
Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002). Therefore, for each ﬁrm, there is a unique function V σ
i (x) that
solves this functional equation for given σ.
2.3 Markov perfect equilibria
So far σ is arbitrary and does not necessarily describe the equilibrium behavior of other ﬁrms. The
following deﬁnition characterizes equilibrium strategies of all ﬁrms as best responses to one another.
DEFINITION: A stationary Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in this game is a set of strategy













2In the terminology of Harsanyi (1995) the proﬁt functions Πi(a1,a 2,...,aN,x) are the conditional payoﬀs and the
expected proﬁt functions π
σ
i (ai,x) are the semi-conditional payoﬀs.
6Following Milgrom and Weber (1985) we can also represent a MPE in probability space.3 First,
notice that for any set of strategies σ, in equilibrium or not, the functions πσ
i , V σ
i and fσ
i depend
on players’ strategies only through the choice probabilities P associated with σ. To emphasize this
point, and to deﬁne a MPE in probability space, we change slightly the notation and use the symbols
πP
i , V P
i and fP
i , respectively, to denote these functions. Let σ∗ be a set of MPE strategies, and let P∗
be the probabilities associated with these strategies. By deﬁnition, P∗
i (ai|x)=
Z
I {ai = σ∗
i(x,εi)}
gi(εi) dεi. Therefore, equilibrium probabilities are a ﬁxed point. That is, P∗ = Λ(P∗),w h e r ef o r

















We call the functions Λi best response probability functions. Given our assumptions on the distri-
bution of private information, best response probability functions are continuous in the compact
set of players’ choice probabilities. By Brower’s theorem, there exists at least one equilibrium. In
general, the equilibrium is not unique.
Equilibrium probabilities solve the coupled ﬁxed-point problems deﬁned by (7) and (9). Given
a set of probabilities P we obtain value functions V P
i as solutions of the N ﬁxed point problems in
(7); and given these value functions we obtain best response probabilities using the right hand-side
of equation (9).
2.4 An alternative best response mapping
We now provide an alternative best response mapping (in probability space) which avoids the
solution of the N dynamic programming problems in (7). The evaluation of this mapping is
computationally much simpler than the evaluation of the mapping Λ(P), and it will prove more
convenient for the estimation of the model.
Let P∗ be an equilibrium, and let V P∗
1 , V P∗
2 ,. . . ,V P∗
N be ﬁrms’ value functions associated with



















(x0|x) is the transition probability of x induced by P∗.4 The term eP∗
i (ai,x) is the
expectation of εi(ai) conditional on x and on alternative ai being the optimal response for player
3Milgrom and Weber consider both discrete-choice and continuous-choice games. In their terminology {P
σ
i } are
called distributional strategies,a n dP















7i. By Proposition 1 in Hotz and Miller (1993), this conditional expectation is a function of ai and
P∗
i (x) only.
Taking equilibrium probabilities as given, expression (10) describes the vector of values V P∗
i as
the solution of a system of linear equations. In vector form:
³













where I is the identity matrix; FP∗






i (ai) and eP∗
i (ai) are vectors of dimension |X| which stack the corresponding state-speciﬁce l -
ements. Let Γi(P∗) ≡ {Γi(x;P∗):x ∈ X} be the solution to this system of linear equations,
such that V P∗
i (x)=Γi(x;P∗). For arbitrary probabilities P, not necessarily in equilibrium, Γi(.)
can be interpreted as a valuation operator: that is, Γi(x;P)is the expected value of ﬁrm i if all
ﬁrms (including ﬁrm i) behave today and in the future according to their choice probabilities in P.
















The only diﬀerence between best response mappings Λi and Ψi is that Ψi takes ﬁrm i0s future
actions as given whereas Λi does not. To evaluate Λi one has to solve N dynamic programming
problems, whereas to obtain Γi and Ψi one only has to solve N systems of linear equations. In the
context of the estimation of the model, we will see that using mapping Ψ instead of Λ provides
signiﬁcant computational gains.
Example (Entry and exit in a local retail market): Consider the example in section 2.1. Expected
current proﬁts if not active are πP
i (0,x)=0and if active they are
πP
i (1,x t)=α0 + α1 dt − α2 (1 − ai,t−1)+α3 cit − δ1 NP




















. We can also write this expected proﬁta sπP
i (1,x t)=zP








,a n dθ is the vector of parameters (α0,α 1,α 2,α 3,δ1,δ2)0.I f







/Pi(1|xt),w h e r eφ(.) and Φ(.) are the density and the cumulative
distribution of the standard normal, respectively. The multiplicative separability of the parameters
θ in expected proﬁts implies that these parameters are also multiplicative separable in the mapping
Γi(P). That is, we can write Γi(P)=ZP
i θ + σλ P
i ,w h e r eZP
i and λP
i are a matrix and a vector
8which are obtained by solving a system of linear equations as in (11) in order to collect the inﬁnite
sum of zP and eP(1,.) terms, respectively, along all possible future paths originating from a given



























i (x0) is the corresponding row of matrix ZP
i .
3 Estimation
3.1 Econometric model and data generating process
Consider a researcher who observes players’ actions and common knowledge state variables across
M geographically separate markets over T periods, where M is large and T is small. This is a
common sampling framework in empirical applications in IO.
Data = {amt,x mt : m =1 ,2,...,M; t =1 ,2,...,T} (15)
where m is the market subindex, and amt =( a1mt,a 2mt,...,a Nmt). An important aspect of the
data is whether players are the same across markets or not. We use the terminology global players
and local players, respectively, to refer to these two cases. In our example of the model of market
entry-exit we may have some large ﬁrms who, active or not, are potential entrants in every local
market, and some other ﬁrms who are potential entrants in only one local market. For instance,
in the fast food industry Mac Donald’s would be a global player whereas a family-owned fast food
outlet would be a local player. Our framework can accommodate both cases. However, we can
allow for heterogeneity in the structural parameters across players only if those players’ decisions are
observed across all or most of the markets. To illustrate both cases, the Monte Carlo experiments
that we present in section 4 are for the model with global players only, and the empirical application
in section 5 is for local players only.
The primitives {Πi,g i,f,β,: i ∈ I} are known to the researcher up to a ﬁnite vector of structural
parameters θ ∈ Θ ⊂ RK. Primitives are continuously diﬀerentiable in θ.L e tθ0 ∈ Θ be the true
value of θ in the population. The researcher is interested in the estimation of θ0. Under Assumption
2 (i.e., conditional independence), the transition probability function f can be estimated from
transition data using a standard maximum likelihood method and without solving the model. We
focus on the estimation of the rest of the primitives. We consider the following assumption on the
data generating process.
9ASSUMPTION 5: Let P0
mt ≡ {Pr(amt = a|xmt = x):( a,x) ∈ AN × X} be the distribution of
amt conditional on xmt in market m at period t. (A) For every observation (m,t) in the sample
P0
mt = P0. (B) Players expect P0 to be played in future (out of sample) periods. (C) There is a
unique θ0 ∈ Θ such that P0 = Ψ(P0;θ0) and P0 6= Ψ(P0;θ) for any θ 6= θ0.
Assumption 5A establishes that the data has been generated by only one Markov Perfect equilib-
rium.5 Without this assumption, we would need to extend the primitives of the model to include a
probability distribution that determines the likelihood with which diﬀerent equilibria are selected.6
Assumption 5B is a natural extension which is necessary in order to accommodate dynamic models.
Without it, we cannot compute the expected future payoﬀs of within-sample actions unless we (once
again) specify the beliefs of players regarding the probability of switching equilibria in the future.
Our assumption avoids the speciﬁcation of ad-hoc equilibrium selection devices. Assumption 5C is
a standard identiﬁcation condition.
3.2 Maximum likelihood estimation
For some values of the structural parameters the model can have multiple equilibria. Therefore,
we have a likelihood correspondence instead of a likelihood function and this makes estimation by
maximum likelihood non-standard. To illustrate this issue, let Υ be the set of equilibrium types
and suppose that this set is discrete and countable, e.g., Υ = {1,2,3...}. An equilibrium type is a
probability function Pτ(θ) where τ ∈ Υ is the index that represents the type. For any type τ we











Under Assumption 5 the population probabilities P0 belong to one and only one equilibrium type.
That is, there is a τ0 ∈ Υ and θ0 ∈ Θ such that P0 = Pτ0(θ0). If we knew the equilibrium type τ0,
we would maximize lτ0(θ) with respect to θ and obtain the MLE of θ0. Under standard regularity
conditions, this estimator is consistent, asymptotically normal and eﬃcient.
However, we do not know the equilibrium type of P0, and therefore this MLE is unfeasible. In
principle, we could consider an algorithm that searches both for the equilibrium type τ0 and for the
5This assumption can be relaxed if we are willing to impose some additional structure on the sampling framework.
For instance, suppose there is a ﬁnite number of equilibria that are played in the data. The pseudo maximum
likelihood methods in this paper can still be applied if the number of observations (markets) of each equilibrium type
goes to inﬁnity with sample size, and the researcher knows the type of equilibria that is played in each market and
time period, and (if diﬀerent equilibria are played over time) players do not anticipate the switch from one equilibrium
to another.
6Moro (2003) introduced the assumption that only one equilibrium is present in the data in a somewhat diﬀerent
context. In his work the researcher observes a function of the equilibrium strategies rather than the equilibrium
object itself; therefore, additional assumptions are needed in order to identify the selected equilibrium from the data.
10vector of parameters θ0. For instance, if we knew and could characterize all the equilibrium types,
we would obtain equilibrium type-speciﬁc ML estimators: for any τ ∈ Υ, ˆ θ
τ
=a r gm a x θ∈Θ lτ(θ).
Then, we could deﬁne the estimator:
ˆ θ = ˆ θ
τ∗





In practice, this estimator can be diﬃcult to implement. First, notice that we need to know
all the equilibrium types that the model has on Θ. This is computationally impractical even for
relatively simple models. Second, to obtain an equilibrium type-speciﬁc estimator, say ˆ θ
τ
, we need
an algorithm that guarantees that for diﬀerent values of θ we always select equilibrium type τ.T h i s
can be a very diﬃcult task for some types of equilibria (see McKelvey and McLennan, 1996). And
third, the computation of this estimator requires one to evaluate the mapping Ψ and the Jacobian
matrix ∂Ψ/∂P0 at many diﬀerent values of P. Though evaluations of Ψ for diﬀerent θ0s can be
relatively cheap because we do not have to invert the matrix (I − βF) in (11), evaluations for
diﬀerent P imply a huge cost when the dimension of the state space is large because this matrix
needs to be inverted each time. Therefore, this estimator can be impractical in models where the
dimension of P is relatively large. For instance, that is the case in most models with heterogenous
players because the dimension of the state space increases exponentially with the number of players.
For that type of models this estimator can be impractical even when the number of players is not
too large. These problems motivate the following pseudo likelihood estimators.
3.3 Pseudo maximum likelihood estimation
The PML estimators try to minimize the number of evaluations of Ψ for diﬀerent vectors of players’










where P is an arbitrary vector of players’ choice probabilities. Suppose that we knew the population
probabilities P0, and consider the following PML estimator:
ˆ θU ≡ argmax
θ∈Θ
QM(θ,P0) (19)
Under standard regularity conditions this estimator is root-M consistent and asymptotically normal,
and its asymptotic variance is Ω−1
θθ ,w h e r eΩθθ is the variance of the pseudo score, i.e., Ωθθ ≡
E({∇θsm}{ ∇θsm}




i=1 lnΨi(aimt|xmt;P0,θ0). Notice that to obtain this
estimator we have to evaluate the mapping Ψ at only one value of players’ choice probabilities.
11However, this PML estimator is unfeasible because P0 is unknown. Suppose that we can obtain
a
√
M−consistent nonparametric estimator of P0. For instance, if there are not unobservable
state variables, we can use a frequency estimator or a kernel method to estimate players’ choice
probabilities. Let ˆ P0 be this nonparametric estimator. Then, we can deﬁne the feasible two-step
PML estimator: ˆ θ2S ≡ argmax
θ∈Θ
QM(θ, ˆ P0). Proposition 1 presents the asymptotic properties of
this estimator.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that: (1) Assumptions 1 to 5 hold; (2) Ψ(P,θ) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable; (3) Θ is a compact set; (4) θ0 ∈ int(Θ);a n d( 5 )l e t ˆ P0 =( 1 /M)
PM
m=1 qm be an




ˆ P0 − P0
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ˆ θ2S − θ0
´




θθ ΩθP ΣΩ 0
θP Ω−1
θθ
and ΩθP ≡ E({∇θsm}{∇Psm}
0),w i t h∇P representing the partial derivative with respect to P.
Given that Ω−1
θθ ΩθP ΣΩ 0
θP Ω−1
θθ is a positive deﬁnite matrix, we have that the feasible PML
estimator is less eﬃcient that the PML based on true P0, i.e., V2S ≥ Ω−1
θθ .F u r t h e r m o r e , i f ˆ P0
A
and ˆ P0
B are two estimators of P0 such that ΣA −ΣB > 0 (positive deﬁnite matrix), then the PML
estimator based on ˆ P0
B has lower asymptotic variance than the estimator based on ˆ P0
A.
Root-M consistency and asymptotic normality of ˆ P0, together with regularity conditions, are
suﬃcient to guarantee root-M consistency and asymptotic normality of this PML estimator. There
are several reasons why this estimator is of interest. It deals with the problem of indeterminacy
associated with multiple equilibria. Furthermore, repeated solutions of the dynamic game are
avoided and this can result in signiﬁcant computational gains.
However, the estimator has several important limitations. First, its asymptotic variance depends
on the variance Σ of the nonparametric estimator ˆ P0. Therefore, it can be very ineﬃcient when
Σ is large. Second, and most importantly, for the sample sizes available in actual applications,
the nonparametric estimator of P0 can be extremely imprecise even when the number of players
is not too large (e.g., 5 players). This can generate serious ﬁnite sample biases in the estimator of
structural parameters. We illustrate this problem with several Monte Carlo experiments in Section
4. And third, for some models it is not possible to obtain consistent nonparametric estimates of
P0. That is the case in models with unobservable market characteristics.
3.4 Nested pseudo likelihood method
The nested pseudo likelihood (NPL) method is a recursive extension of the two-step PML estimator.
Let ˆ P0 be an initial guess of the vector of players’ choice probabilities. It is important to emphasize
12that this guess need not be a consistent estimator of P0.G i v e nˆ P0, NPL generates a sequence of
estimators {ˆ θK : K ≥ 1} where the K − stage estimator is deﬁned as:
ˆ θK =a r g m a x
θ∈Θ
QM(θ, ˆ PK−1) (20)
and the probabilities { ˆ PK : K ≥ 1} are obtained recursively as:
ˆ PK = Ψ(ˆ θK, ˆ PK−1) (21)
That is, ˆ θ1 maximizes the pseudo likelihood QM(θ, ˆ P0);g i v e nˆ P0 and ˆ θ1 we obtain a new vector
of probabilities by iterating in the equilibrium mapping, i.e., ˆ P1 = Ψ(ˆ θ1, ˆ P0); then, ˆ θ2 maximizes
the pseudo likelihood QM(θ, ˆ P1);a n ds oo n . ANPL ﬁxed-point is the limit of this sequence, if
it exists.7 Clearly, a NPL ﬁxed point (ˆ θNPL, ˆ PNPL) has the following two properties: (a) ˆ θNPL
maximizes the pseudo likelihood QM(θ, ˆ PNPL) and (b) ˆ PNPL = Ψ(ˆ θNPL, ˆ PNPL).F o r a n y g i v e n
sample, Brower’s theorem guarantees the existence of at least one NPL ﬁxed-point.8 However, the
set of NPL ﬁxed-points may contain more than one pair (θ,P). The NPL estimator is deﬁned as
the NPL ﬁxed-point associated with the maximum value of the pseudo likelihood. Proposition 2
establishes the large sample properties of this estimator.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that: (1) Assumptions 1 to 5 hold; (2) Ψ(P,θ) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable; (3) Θ is a compact set; (4) θ0 ∈ int(Θ); and (5) the NPL estimator is the NPL ﬁxed-




















where ∇PΨ is the Jacobian matrix ∇PΨ(P0,θ0). Furthermore, if the matrix ∇PΨ has all its eigen-
values between 0 and 1, the NPL estimator is more eﬃcient than the unfeasible PML estimator,
i.e., VNPL < Ω−1
θθ <V 2S.
NPL estimation maintains the two main advantages of PML: it is feasible in models with multiple
equilibria, and it minimizes the number of evaluations of the mapping Ψ for diﬀerent values of P.
Furthermore, it addresses the three limitations of the two-stage PML that were mentioned above.
First, under some conditions on the Jacobian matrix ∇PΨ, the NPL is asymptotically more eﬃcient
than the unfeasible PML and therefore more eﬃcient than any two-step PML estimator, whatever
7Although we have not proved convergence of the NPL algorithm in general, we have always obtained convergence
in our Monte Carlo experiments and applications.
8The pseudo score ∂QM(θ,P)/∂θ and the equilibrium mapping P − Ψ(θ,P) are continuous mappings in the
compact set of (θ,P).
13the initial estimator of P0 that we use. In other words, imposing the equilibrium condition in the
sample can yield asymptotic eﬃciency gains relative to the two-step PML estimators. The last part
of Proposition 2 provides one set of suﬃcient conditions for such a result to hold. Second, in small
samples the NPL estimator reduces the ﬁnite sample bias generated by imprecise estimates of P0.
This point is illustrated in the Monte Carlo experiments of section 4. And third, consistency of the
NPL estimator does not require that we start the algorithm with a consistent estimator of choice
probabilities. If the initial guess ˆ P0 is a consistent estimator, consistency of a NPL ﬁxed-point
is straightforward because all elements of the sequence of estimators {b θK, ˆ PK : K ≥ 1} obtained
from the NPL algorithm are consistent (see Aguirregabiria and Mira 2002 for a recursive proof in
the single agent context). If the researcher uses an initial guess which is not consistent, such as a
reduced form parametric approximation with unknown probability limit, the NPL estimator will
still converge in probability to an NPL ﬁxed-point of the Q∞(θ,P) function, the probability limit
of the sample criterion QM(θ,P). If the population function has more than one ﬁxed-point local
maximum, a ’poorly behaved’ initial guess ˆ P0 might identify a NPL ﬁxed point which is not (θ0,P0).
Condition (5) in Proposition 2 rules this out. In practical terms this means that the researcher
should initiate the NPL with diﬀerent P guesses and, if diﬀerent limits are attained he should choose
the one which maximizes the value of the pseudo likelihood. A particularly important implication
of this is that NPL may be applied to situations in which some time-invariant market characteristics
are unobserved by the researcher. This case is treated in some detail in the Appendix.
4 Monte Carlo experiments
This section presents the results from several Monte Carlo experiments based on a dynamic game
of market entry and exit with heterogeneous ﬁrms. The speciﬁcation of the proﬁt function of ﬁrm
i is:







dmt represents the size of market m at period t (e.g., population in the market). The parameters
to estimate are {α0i : i =1 ,2,...N}, α1, α2 and δ. The parameters α2 and δ represent entry
cost and the magnitude of strategic interactions, respectively, and they are particularly important
for the dynamics of market structure in this model. We consider a sampling framework in which
the same N ﬁrms are the potential entrants over M separate markets. The following primitives
are invariant across the diﬀerent experiments: N =5 , α01 = −1.9, α02 = −1.8, α03 = −1.7,
α04 = −1.6, α05 = −1.5, α1 =1 , β =0 .95,a n d{εimt} are iid extreme value with zero mean and
unit dispersion. Also, the variable dmt has a discrete support with 5 points and it follows a ﬁrst
14order Markov process which is homogeneous across markets.9 For each experiment, we computed
one MPE by iterating in the best response probability mapping starting with a vector of choice
probabilities Pi(ai =1 |x)=0 .5 for every i and x. We have implemented experiments with sample
size M = 200 and M =4 0 0markets, but the results are very similar and we report here only results
for M = 400. For each experiment we use 1000 Monte Carlo simulations to approximate the ﬁnite
sample distribution of the estimators. The transition probability of the variable dmt is considered
a sk n o w ni nt h e s ee x p e r i m e n t s .
Entry costs, α2, and the magnitude of strategic interactions, δ, vary over the experiments. We
consider values of α2 between 0 and 4 and values of δ between 0 and 2. T og i v ea ni d e ao ft h e
magnitude of these values, notice that the expected one-period proﬁto fﬁrm i =5(i.e., the most
eﬃcient ﬁrm) is:
Under monopoly :P r ofit(firm 5) = α05 + α1E(dmt)= 1 .5
Under duopoly :P r ofit(firm 5) = α05 + α1E(dmt) − δ ln(2) = 1.5 − 0.69 δ
With three firms :P r ofit(firm 5) = α05 + α1E(dmt) − δ ln(3) = 1.5 − 1.10 δ
Therefore, δ =1implies that proﬁts of this ﬁrm decrease by 54% when we go from a monopoly to a
duopoly, and by 73% when we go from monopoly to three ﬁrms. With δ =2 , these percentages are
92% and 147%, respectively. An entry cost α2 =1implies 67% of ﬁrm 5’s proﬁta sam o n o p o l i s t ,
and 124% of its proﬁt as a duopolist (with δ =1 ).
Table 1 presents the values of α2 and δ in the diﬀerent experiments, as well as some descriptive
statistics associated with the Markov perfect equilibrium of each experiment.10 An increase in δ
reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁts and therefore it reduces the number of ﬁrms in the market and the probability
of entry, and it increases the probability of exit. The eﬀect on the number of exits (or entries) is
ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model.11 I nT a b l e1 ,w ec a ns e et h a tf o rl a r g e r
values of δ we get fewer active ﬁrms but more exits and entries. We can also see that in markets with
higher entry costs we have lower turnover and more persistence in the number of ﬁrms. Interestingly,
increasing the cost of entry has diﬀerent eﬀects on the heterogenous potential entrants. That is, it
9The support of dmt is {1,2,3,4,5}, and the transition probability matrix is:

   

0.80 .20 .00 .00 .0
0.20 .60 .20 .00 .0
0.00 .20 .60 .20 .0
0.00 .00 .20 .60 .2
0.00 .00 .00 .20 .8

   

10The descriptive statistics in Table 1 were obtained using a large sample of 50,000 markets where the initial values
of state variables were drawn from their steady-state distribution.
11Notice that the number of exits is equal to the number of active ﬁrms times the probability of exit. While a
higher δ increases the probability of exit, it also reduces the number of active ﬁrms, and therefore its eﬀect on the
number of exits is ambiguous.
15tends to increase the probability of being active of relatively more eﬃcient ﬁrms, and reduces that
probability for the more ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
For each of these six experiments we have obtained the two-step PML and the NPL estimators
under the following choices of the initial vector of probabilities: (1) the true vector of equilibrium
probabilities P0; (2) nonparametric frequency estimates; (3) logit models, one for each ﬁrm, with
explanatory variables {am,t−1,d mt}; and (4) random draws from a U(0,1).T h e ﬁrst case is the
unfeasible or PML estimator (which we label ’2-true’) and we will use it as a benchmark for
comparison with the other estimators. The estimator initiated with logit estimates (’2-logit’) is
not consistent but it has lower variance than the estimator initiated with nonparametric frequency
estimates (’2-freq’) and therefore it can have better properties in small samples. The random
values for ˆ P0 represent an extreme case of inconsistent initial estimates of choice probabilities.
Notice that with 400 observations an a state space with 160 points, the frequency estimator is also
very imprecise, i.e., most estimates are zeros or ones.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize the results from these experiments. Table 2 presents the median
number of iterations it takes the NPL algorithm to obtain a NPL ﬁxed-point. Table 3 shows the
empirical mean and standard deviations of the estimators based on the 1000 replications. Table
4 compares the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the 2-freq, 2-logit and NPL estimators by showing
the ratio of the MSE of each of them to the MSE of the ’benchmark’ 2-true estimator.
Remark 1: The NPL algorithm always converged and, more importantly, it always converged to
the same estimates regardless of the value of ˆ P0 (true, nonparametric, logit or random) that we
used to initialize the procedure. This was the case not only for the 6,000 data sets generated in
the six experiments presented here, but also for other similar experiments that we do not report
here (e.g., 6,000 data sets with 200 observations). Of course, this may be a property only speciﬁc
of our functional form assumptions (e.g., logit, multiplicative separability of parameters) or of the
equilibria we considered (e.g., stable equilibrium). But it is encouraging to see that, at least for this
particular class of models, the NPL works even when initial probabilities are random. We obtained
the same result when using actual data in the application in section 5.
Remark 2: Table 2 shows that with δ =1 , we need a relatively small number of iterations to obtain
the NPL estimator. With δ =2 , the number of NPL iterations is signiﬁcantly larger. In general,
the algorithm converges faster when we initialize it with the logit estimates.
Remark 3: The two-freq estimator has a very large bias in all the experiments, though its variance
is similar to, and sometimes even smaller than, the variances of NPL and two-true estimators.
Therefore, it seems that the main limitation of two-freq is not its larger asymptotic variance (relative
16to NPL) but its large bias in small samples.
Remark 4: The NPLestimator performs very well relative to the two-true estimator both in terms
of variance and bias. The square-root MSE of the NPL estimator is never more than 27% larger
than that of the 2-true estimator. In fact, the NPLestimator can have lower MSE than the 2-true
estimator. This was always the case in experiments where the parameter δ is relatively large, as in
experiment 3.
Remark 5: The two-logit performs very well for this simple model. In fact, it has very similar bias
and variance as the NPL estimator. Only in experiment 4, with δ =2 ,w eﬁnd very signiﬁcant
gains in term of lower bias and variance of using NPL instead of two-logit estimator. In general, the
stronger the strategic interactions the more important the gains of iterating in the NPL procedure.
Remark 6: In all the experiments, the most important gains associated with the NPL estimator
occur for the entry cost parameter, α2
5A n a p p l i c a t i o n
5.1 Data and descriptive evidence
This section presents an empirical application of a dynamic game of ﬁrm entry and exit in local
retail markets. The data come from a census of Chilean ﬁrms created for tax purposes by the
Chilean Servicio de Impuestos Internos (Internal Revenue Service). This census contains the whole
population of Chilean ﬁrms paying sales taxes. Sales taxes are mandatory for any ﬁrm in Chile
regardless of its size, industry, region, etc. The data set has a panel structure; it has annual
frequency and covers the years 1994 to 1999. The variables in the data set at the ﬁrm level are:
(1) ﬁrm identiﬁcation number; (2) ﬁrm industry at the 5 digit level; (3) annual sales, discretized in
twelve cells; and (4) the comuna (i.e., county) where the ﬁrm is located. We combine these data
with information on population from the 1992 and 2002 censuses at the level of comunas.
We consider ﬁve retail industries and estimate a separate model for each of them. The industries
are: restaurants, bookstores, gas stations, shoe shops, and ﬁsh shops. Competition in these retail
industries occurs at the local level, and we consider comunas as local markets. There are 342
comunas in Chile. In order to have a sample of independent local markets we exclude those
comunas in the metropolitan areas of the larger towns: Santiago (52 comunas), Valparaiso (9
comunas), Rancagua (17 comunas), Concepcion (11 comunas), Talca (10.comunas) and Temuco
(20.comunas). We also exclude comunas with populations larger than 50,000 because it is likely
that they have more than one market (34 comunas). Our working sample contains 189 comunas.
17In 1999, the median population of a comuna in our sample was 10,400,a n dt h eﬁrst and third
quartiles were 5,400 and 17,900, respectively.
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on the structure and the dynamics of these markets. There
a r es o m es i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerences in the structure of the ﬁve industries. The number of restaurants
(20 ﬁrms per 10,000 people) is much larger than the number of gas stations, bookstores or shoe
shops (between 1 and 4 ﬁrms per 10,000 people). Market concentration, measured by the Herﬁndahl
index, is smaller in the restaurant industry. Firm size (i.e., revenue per ﬁr m )i sa l m o s tf o u rt i m e s
larger in gas stations than in restaurants. Turnover rates are very high in all these retail industries.
It is diﬃcult to survive during the ﬁrst three years after entry. However, survival is more likely in
gas stations than in the other industries.
There are at least three factors that could explain why the number of restaurants is much larger
than the number of gas stations or bookstores. First, diﬀerences in economies of scale are potentially
important. The proportion of ﬁxed costs in total operating costs may be smaller for restaurants.
Second, diﬀerences in entry sunk costs might also be relevant. While the creation of a new gas
station or a new bookstore requires an important investment in industry-speciﬁc capital, this type
of irreversible investment may be less important for restaurants. And third, strategic interactions
could be smaller between restaurants than between other retail businesses. For instance, product
diﬀerentiation might be more important among restaurants than among gas stations. To analyze
how these three factors contribute to explain the diﬀerences between these industries, we estimate
a model of entry and exit that incorporates these elements.
5.2 Speciﬁcation
The proﬁt function if the ﬁrm operates in the market is:






+ ωm + εimt (23)
POPmt is the population in market m and year t.T h e v a r i a b l e ωm represents time-invariant
market characteristics that are common knowledge to the players but are unobservable to us.
Appendix B describes the NPL estimator for this model with unobserved time-invariant market
characteristics. We assume that ωm is i.i.d. over markets N(0,σ2
ω).12 T h ee c o n o m i ci n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of the parameters is the following: −α0 is a ﬁxed operating cost; α2 is an entry sunk cost; α1
measures how the variable proﬁt of a monopolist increases with market size; and δ captures the
eﬀect of the number of competitors on a ﬁrm’s proﬁt, i.e., strategic interactions. We assume that the
12In fact, both ln(POP mt) and ωm have discrete distributions. For ωm we consider a discretized version of a normal
distribution with zero mean. The support is symmetric around zero with 21 points. We use the method in Tauchen
(1986) to discretize the AR(1) process for ln(POP mt). We consider 10 points in the support of ln(POP mt).
18logarithm of POPmt follows an AR(1) process where the autoregressive parameter is homogeneous
across markets but the mean varies over markets:
ln(POPmt)=ηm + ρ ln(POPm,t−1)+umt (24)
The vector of state variables in this model includes the incumbent indicator of each ﬁrm at
the beginning of the year (i.e., aim,t−1 for i =1 ,2,...,N). The number of states associated with
these state variables is 2N, which is intractable. However, the structure of this model is such that
we can reduce the number of states to 2N. First, notice that all ﬁrms are ex-ante identical, and
therefore we consider symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. That is, every incumbent ﬁrm has the
same probability of exit, and every potential entrant has the same probability of entry. And second,
a ﬁrm’s proﬁt depends on the number of competitors but not on the identity of the competitors.
Taking into account these two features of the model, it is simple to show that the all the information
in {aim,t−1 : i =1 ,2,...,N} that is relevant to predict a ﬁrms’ current and future proﬁts is contained
in just two variables: the ﬁrm’s own incumbent status, aim,t−1, and the number of incumbent ﬁrms,
nm,t−1. The number of states associated with these two variables is 2N.
5.3 Estimation results
The parameters of the AR(1) process for the logarithm of population are estimated by full maximum
likelihood using data for the period 1990-2003. The estimate of the autoregressive coeﬃcient is
0.9757 (s.e. = 0.0008). Other estimation methods provide very similar estimates.13 To obtain the
matrices of transition probabilities associated with a discretization of these AR(1) processes we use
the method in Tauchen (1986).
The number of potential entrants is constant over time but varies over markets and industries.
We consider the number of potential entrants in each market as parameters to estimate. Our
estimate of the number of potential entrants in market m is:




{nm,t−1 + enmt} ;2
¾
(25)
where nm,t−1 is the number of ﬁrms active in market m at period t−1; enmt is the number of new
entrants at period t; and we assume that there are at least two potential entrants in each market.
It is straightforward to show that this estimator is consistent as T →∞ .T a b l e 6 p r e s e n t s t h e
distribution of the number of potential entrants for each industry.
13The within-groups (or ﬁxed eﬀects) estimator is 0.9766 (s.e. = 0.0008). OLS in ﬁrst diﬀerences: 0.9739 (s.e. =
0.0032). And the IV in ﬁrst diﬀerences using population at t − 2 as instrument is 0.9706 (s.e. = 0.0128).
19Table 7 presents NPL estimates of this model for the ﬁve industries.14 In spite of the parsi-
monious speciﬁcation of the model, with only ﬁve parameters, the measures of goodness of ﬁta r e
high. Both for the number of entrants and for the number of exits, the R-square coeﬃcients are
always larger than 0.19. All the parameters have the expected signs. It is important to notice that
in the estimation of a version of the model without unobserved market characteristics we obtained
negative estimates of δ in the gas station and the shoe shop industries.
As it is common in discrete choice models, the parameters in the proﬁt function are identiﬁed
only up to scale. Given that the dispersion of the unobservable ε0s may change across industries,
we cannot obtain the relative magnitude of ﬁxed costs, entry costs or strategic interactions by just
comparing the values of α0/σ, α2/σ or δ/σ for diﬀerent industries. For this reason, we also report
three normalized coeﬃcients at the bottom of Table 7. The coeﬃcient exp(−α0/α1) represents the
minimum market population such that variable proﬁts of a monopolist can cover ﬁxed operating
costs. We can see that ﬁxed operating costs, relative to variable proﬁts, are smaller in restaurants
than in the other four industries. This can be a major factor to explain the relatively large number
of ﬁrms in the restaurant industry. Bookstores are the retailers with the larger proportion of
ﬁxed costs in total operating costs. The coeﬃcient exp(α2/α1) represents the minimum market
population such that variable proﬁts of a monopolist can cover entry sunk costs. The estimates
of this coeﬃcient are signiﬁcantly smaller than for the coeﬃcient exp(−α0/α1) associated with
ﬁxed operating costs. It seems that for these retail industries sunk entry costs are small relative
to ﬁxed operating costs. Gas stations are the retailers with larger sunk costs. However, the inter-
industry diﬀerences in sunk costs explain little of the diﬀerences in the number of ﬁrms. The
importance of strategic interactions can be measured by the coeﬃcient δ ln(2)/α1.I tr e p r e s e n t st h e
percentage increase in market population such that proﬁts of a duopolist in the larger market are
equal to proﬁts of a monopolist in the smaller market. According to this coeﬃcient, restaurants and
bookstores are the retailers with the smallest strategic interactions. This might be due to product
diﬀerentiation in these two industries.
Based on these estimations the main diﬀerences between these retail industries can be sum-
marized as follows. First, economies of scale are very small in the restaurant industry, and this
is a main factor to explain the relatively large number of restaurants. Second, strategic interac-
tions are particularly small among restaurants and among bookstores, what might be due to more
product diﬀerentiation in these industries. Third, economies of scale are particularly important in
the bookstore industry. However, the number of bookstores is in fact larger than the number of
14The discount factor is ﬁxed at β =0 .95. As in the case of the Monte Carlo experiments, we initialize the NPL
algorithm with diﬀerent vectors of probabilities and we always converged to the same NPL ﬁxed point.
20gas stations or the number of shoe shops. The reason is that negative strategic interactions are
very small in this industry. And fourth, industry speciﬁc investments, i.e., sunk costs, are small
in all these industries. Gas stations is the industry with larger sunk costs, but the magnitude of
these costs does not explain very much of the small number of ﬁrms in this industry. However, it
contributes to explain the higher survival probabilities for gas stations.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a class of empirical dynamic discrete games and studies the estimation of
structural parameters in these models. We are particularly concerned with two estimation problems:
the computational burden in the solution of the game, and the problem of multiple equilibria. We
proposed two diﬀerent pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) methods that deal with these issues: two-
step PML and nested PML. We argue that the second method has several potential advantages
relative to the ﬁrst. These advantages are illustrated in our Monte Carlo experiments and in a
empirical application. In particular, the two-step PML tend to have a larger ﬁnite sample bias
than the NPL.
21APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
Notation: For notational simplicity we consider in this appendix that T =1 , and we omit the time
subindex. We use P0
(a,x) to denote the vector of dimension NJ|X|×1 with the joint distribution of
am and xm in the population. ˆ P0
(a,x) is the sample counterpart of P0
(a,x), i.e., the frequency estimator
of P0












i=1 lnΨi(aim|xm;θ,P)=l n Ψ(θ,P)0 ˆ P0
(a,x)
(A.1)
We use also ∇θΨ(P,θ) and ∇PΨ(P,θ) to denote the Jacobian matrices ∂Ψ(P,θ)/∂θ0 and ∂Ψ(P,θ)/∂P0,
respectively.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Consistency of two-step PML: Deﬁne Q∞(P,θ) ≡ E(
P
i lnΨi(aim|xm;P,θ)).N o t i c et h a t :( a )
Q∞(P,θ) is uniformly continuous; (b) QM(P,θ) converges a.s. and uniformly in (P,θ) to Q∞(P,θ);
and (c) ˆ P0 converges a.s. to P0. Under (a)-(c), QM( ˆ P0,θ) converges a.s. and uniformly in θ to
Q∞(P0,θ) (Lemma 24.1 in Gourieroux and Monfort). By the identiﬁcation assumption 5C, θ0 is
the only vector in Θ such that Ψ(θ,P0)=P0 Therefore, by the information inequality Q∞(P0,θ)
has a unique maximum in Θ at θ0. It follows that ˆ θ2S ≡ argmaxθ∈Θ QM( ˆ P0,θ) converges a.s. to
θ0 (Property 24.2 in Gourieroux and Monfort).
Asymptotic distribution of two-step PML: Let ∇θsm and ∇Psm be the pseudo scores (for





i=1 ∇P lnΨi(aim|xm;P0,θ0).D e ﬁne Ωθθ ≡ E (∇θsm∇θs0
m) and ΩθP ≡ E (∇θsm∇Ps0
m).





































The ﬁrst order conditions that deﬁne this estimator are ∇θQM( ˆ P0,ˆ θFU)=0 .A m e a n v a l u e
theorem between (θ0,P0) and (ˆ θ2S, ˆ P0), together with consistency of (ˆ θ2S, ˆ P0), implies that:
0=∇θQM(P0,θ0)+∇θθQM(P0,θ0)
³




ˆ P0 − P0
´
+ op(1) (A.3)
By the CLT and the information matrix inequality, we have that ∇θθQM(P0,θ0) →p −Ωθθ,a n d






























ˆ θ2S − θ0
´
converges in distribution to a vector of normal random
variables with zero means and variance matrix:
V2S = Ω−1




θθ ΩθP ΣΩ 0
θP Ω−1
θθ (A.5)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Consistency of the NPL: The NPL estimator (ˆ θNPL, ˆ PNPL) is deﬁned by conditions: (a) ˆ θNPL
maximizes in θ ∈ Θ the pseudo likelihood QM(θ, ˆ PNPL);( b )ˆ PNPL = Ψ(ˆ θNPL, ˆ PNPL);a n d( c )
for any (θ,P) satisfying conditions (a) and (b), QM(ˆ θNPL, ˆ PNPL) ≥ QM(θ,P).S i n c eQ∞(θ,P) is
uniformly continuous and QM(θ,P) converges a.s. and uniformly in (θ,P) to Q∞(θ,P),w eh a v e
that (ˆ θNPL, ˆ PNPL) converges a.s. to a point (θ∗,P∗) such that: (a’) θ∗ maximizes in θ ∈ Θ the
population pseudo likelihood Q∞(θ,P∗);( b ’ )P∗ = Ψ(θ∗,P∗); and (c’) for any (θ,P) satisfying
conditions (a’) and (b’), Q∞(θ∗,P∗) ≥ Q∞(θ,P).N o w ,w es h o wt h a tt h i sp o i n t(θ∗,P∗) should be
(θ0,P0). By the identiﬁcation assumption 5C, (θ0,P0) satisﬁes conditions (a’) and (b’). That is,
P0 = Ψ(θ0,P0) and by the Kullback-Leibler information inequality we have that for any θ ∈ Θ,
Q∞(θ,P0) ≤ Q∞(P0,θ0). For any other point (θ,P) that satisﬁes conditions (a’) and (b’), we
have that P 6= P0 (again by assumption 5C). Therefore, Kullback-Leibler information inequality
implies that for any (θ,P) 6=( θ0,P0) satisfying conditions (a’) and (b’), we have that Q∞(θ,P) <
Q∞(P0,θ0). We conclude that (θ0,P0) is the only pair that satisﬁes conditions (a’), (b’) and (c’),
and therefore the NPL estimator converges a.s. to θ0.




m=1 ∇θsm( ˆ P,ˆ θ)=0
ˆ P − Ψ( ˆ P,ˆ θ)=0
(A.6)





































Solving the second set of equations into the ﬁrst set, we get:
h











m=1 ∇θsm + op(
√
M) (A.8)




ˆ θ − θ0
´
−→ d N (0,V NPL) where:
VNPL =
h





Ωθθ + ∇θΨ0 ¡




Relative eﬃciency of NPL and Unrestricted PML: The asymptotic variance of ˆ θU is Ω−1
θθ .










θθ ∇θΨ0 S0 ∇θΨ
¢¤−1
(A.10)
where S ≡ (I −∇ PΨ0)
−1 ∇PΨ diag(P0)−1. Then, Ω−1
θθ − VNPL is positive deﬁnite if
∆ =
¡






θθ ∇θΨ0 S0 ∇θΨ
¢
− Ωθθ (A.11)
is positive deﬁnite. Operating in the previous expression we can get that:











It is clear that ∆ is positive deﬁnite if S is positive deﬁnite. Since diag(P0)−1 is a positive deﬁnite
diagonal matrix, ∆ is positive deﬁnite if (I −∇ PΨ0)
−1 ∇PΨ0 is positive deﬁnite. Finally, a suﬃcient
condition for (I −∇ PΨ0)
−1 ∇PΨ0 to be positive deﬁnite is that all the eigenvalues of ∇PΨ0 are
b e t w e e n0a n d1 .
24APPENDIX B: MODEL WITH PERMANENT UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY
Let xmt be the observable state variables, and suppose that there is also a vector of time invariant
common knowledge unobservable market characteristics, ωm. For instance, in the entry-exit model,
we may have a proﬁt function:






+ ωm + εimt (B.1)
where ωm represents time-invariant market characteristics aﬀecting ﬁrms’ proﬁts, which are com-
mon knowledge to the players but are unobservable to the econometrician. We make the following
assumptions on the distribution of these unobservables.
ASSUMPTION 6: The vector of unobservable variables ωm is such that: (A) it has a discrete
and ﬁnite support Ω =
©
ω1,ω2,...,ωLª
; (B) it is independently and identically distributed over
markets with probability mass function ϕl ≡ Pr(ωm = ωl);a n d( C )ωm does not enter into the
conditional transition probability of xmt,i . e . ,Pr(xm,t+1|amt,x mt,ωm)=f(xm,t+1|amt,x mt).
Assumption 6C states that all markets are homogenous with respect to (exogenous) transitions,
and it implies that the transition probability functions f can still be estimated from transition data
without solving the model. The other parameters θ to be estimated now include the support and
the distribution of the unobservables ω.
The vector P now stacks the distributions of players’ actions conditional on all values of ob-
servable and unobservable common knowledge state variables. Pl is the subvector describing the
equilibrium in a market with unobservable ωl (i.e., a ’type l ’market). We adapt assumptions 5AB
on the data generating process as follows:
ASSUMPTION 5’: Let P0
mt ≡ {Pr(amt = a|xmt = x,ωm = ω):( a,x,ω) ∈ AN × X × Ω} be the
distributions of amt conditional on xmt and ωm in market m at period t. (A) For every observation
(m,t) in the sample P0
mt = P0. (B) Players expect P0 to be played in future (out of sample)
periods.
Assumption 5 still states that only one equilibrium is played in the data conditional on market
type, which is unobservable to the econometrician but not to players. Now, to obtain the pseudo
likelihood function we integrate the best response probabilities over the distribution of unobservable
market characteristics. We have that:
lnPr(Data|θ,P)=
XM




l=1 ϕl Pr(˜ am, ˜ xm|ωl;θ,P)
¶
(B.2)
where ˜ am = {amt : t =1 ,2,...,T} and ˜ xm = {xmt : t =1 ,2,...,T}. Applying the chain rule, the
25Markov structure of the model, and assumption 6C, we get:













































t=2 ln f(xmt|am,t−1,x m,t−1;θ)
(B.4)
The ﬁrst component in the right hand side is the pseudo likelihood function QM(θ,P). The second
component is the part of the likelihood associated with transition data. As we have mentioned
above, the transition probability functions f c a ns t i l lb ee s t i m a t e df r o mt r a n s i t i o nd a t aw i t h o u t
solving the model.
Given our sampling framework, the observed state vector at the ﬁrst observation for each
market xm1 is not exogenous with respect to unobserved market type: Pr(xm1|ωm) 6=P r ( xm1).
This is the, so called, initial conditions problem in the estimation of dynamic discrete models
with autocorrelated unobservables (Heckman, 1981). Under the assumption that xm1 is drawn
from the stationary distribution induced by the Markov perfect equilibrium, we may implement a
computationally tractable solution of this problem. Let p∗(x;f,P) be the steady state probability



















Given this pseudo likelihood function, the NPL estimator is deﬁned as in Section 3.4. In order to
obtain consistency the identiﬁcation condition in assumption 5 is suitably modiﬁed:















Notice that to start the NPL algorithm we need guesses of all conditional choice probability
vectors {Pl : l =1 ,...,L}, all of which will be updated at each iteration: b Pl,K = Ψ(b θK, b Pl,K−1).A t
each NPL iteration we also need to re-calculate the steady state distributions p∗(.;f,Pl).H o w e v e r ,
26these steady state probabilities are ﬁxed within an NPL iteration, which facilitates very much the
estimation of this model with permanent unobserved heterogeneity.
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Parameters(1) and Description of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5 Exp. 6
α2 =1 .0 α2 =1 .0 α2 =1 .0 α2 =0 .0 α2 =2 .0 α2 =4 .0
Descriptive Statistics δ =0 .0 δ =1 .0 δ =2 .0 δ =1 .0 δ =1 .0 δ =1 .0
(1) Number active ﬁrms: Average 3.676 2.760 1.979 2.729 2.790 2.801
(2) Number of ﬁrms: Std. Dev. 1.551 1.661 1.426 1.515 1.777 1.905
( 3 ) A R ( 1 )f o rn u m b e ra c t i v eﬁrms 0.744 0.709 0.571 0.529 0.818 0.924
(autoregressive parameter)
(4) Number of Entrants 0.520 0.702 0.748 0.991 0.463 0.206
(or Exits) per period
(5) Excess Turnover(2) 0.326 0.470 0.516 0.868 0.211 0.029
(in # of ﬁrms per period)
(6) Correlation between -0.015 -0.169 -0.220 -0.225 -0.140 -0.110
entries and exits
(7) Prob. being active: Firm 1 0.699 0.496 0.319 0.508 0.487 0.455
" Firm 2 0.718 0.527 0.356 0.523 0.521 0.501
" Firm 3 0.735 0.548 0.397 0.547 0.556 0.550
" Firm 4 0.753 0.581 0.434 0.564 0.592 0.610
" Firm 5 0.770 0.607 0.475 0.586 0.632 0.686
Note 1: For all these experiments, the values of the rest of the parameters are: N =5 , α01 = −1.9,
α02 = −1.8, α03 = −1.7, α04 = −1.6, α05 = −1.5, α1 =1 .0,σ ε =1 , and β =0 .95.
Note 2: Excess turnover is deﬁned as (#Entrants + #Exits)-abs(#Entrants - #Exits).
31Table 2
Monte Carlo Experiments
Median Number of Iterations of the NPL Algorithm
Initial Probabilities
Frequencies Logits Random
Experiment 1 84 6
Experiment 2 11 7 9
Experiment 3 27 19 23
Experiment 4 16 8 11
Experiment 5 12 7 9
Experiment 6 13 9 10
32Table 3
Monte Carlo Experiments
Empirical Means and Empirical Standard Deviations of Estimators
Estimator Parmeters
α01 α1 α2 δ
Experiment 1 True values -1.900 1.000 1.000 0.000
1-stage (True P0) -1.915 (0.273) 1.007 (0.152) 1.002 (0.139) 0.002 (0.422)
1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) -0.458 (0.289) 0.374 (0.141) 1.135 (0.190) 0.200 (0.364)
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) -1.929 (0.279) 1.006 (0.153) 0.997 (0.138) -0.009 (0.431)
NPL -1.902 (0.279) 1.018 (0.157) 0.994 (0.139) 0.036 (0.439)
Experiment 2 True values -1.900 1.000 1.000 1.000
1-stage (True P0) -1.894 (0.212) 1.002 (0.186) 1.007 (0.118) 1.007 (0.583)
1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) -0.919 (0.208) 0.351 (0.119) 0.886 (0.123) 0.095 (0.337)
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) -1.920 (0.226) 0.977 (0.197) 1.000 (0.122) 0.915 (0.597)
NPL -1.893 (0.232) 1.016 (0.220) 0.998 (0.121) 1.050 (0.681)
Experiment 3 True values -1.900 1.000 1.000 2.000
1-stage (True P0) -1.910 (0.183) 1.006 (0.209) 1.000 (0.112) 2.008 (0.783)
1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) -1.126 (0.189) 0.286 (0.094) 0.792 (0.107) 0.027 (0.311)
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) -1.919 (0.248) 1.022 (0.305) 0.985 (0.145) 2.070 (1.110)
NPL -1.920 (0.232) 0.950 (0.189) 1.007 (0.116) 1.792 (0.667)
Experiment 4 True values -1.900 1.000 0.000 1.000
1-stage (True P0) -1.890 (0.516) 1.020 (0.329) 0.001 (0.119) 1.063 (1.345)
1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) -0.910 (0.243) 0.337 (0.104) 0.239 (0.113) 0.127 (0.354)
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) -2.070 (0.436) 0.903 (0.262) 0.000 (0.119) 0.571 (1.061)
NPL -1.891 (0.482) 1.014 (0.291) 0.001 (0.115) 1.047 (1.186)
Experiment 5 True values -1.900 1.000 2.000 1.000
1-stage (True P0) -1.912 (0.178) 1.007 (0.142) 2.008 (0.132) 1.006 (0.359)
1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) -0.840 (0.218) 1.379 (0.130) 1.591 (0.143) 0.181 (0.302)
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) -1.921 (0.204) 0.997 (0.167) 2.002 (0.138) 0.971 (0.405)
NPL -1.924 (0.203) 1.018 (0.178) 2.000 (0.137) 1.027 (0.435)
Experiment 6 True values -1.900 1.000 4.000 1.000
1-stage (True P0) -1.899 (0.206) 1.003 (0.132) 4.050 (0.203) 1.006 (0.238)
1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) -0.558 (0.228) 0.332 (0.128) 2.745 (0.211) 0.206 (0.238)
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) -1.895 (0.240) 0.996 (0.147) 4.048 (0.208) 0.992 (0.277)
NPL -1.918 (0.239) 1.009 (0.152) 4.044 (0.207) 1.009 (0.285) 33Table 4
Square-root Mean Square Error
Relative to the 1-stage PML with true P0
Estimator Parmeters
α01 α1 α2 δ
Experiment 1 1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) 5.380 4.222 1.676 0.983
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) 1.027 1.006 1.002 1.022
NPL 1.019 1.040 0.996 1.044
Experiment 2 1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) 4.736 3.553 1.415 1.655
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) 1.070 1.066 1.029 1.034
NPL 1.098 1.188 1.020 1.171
Experiment 3 1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) 4.347 3.440 2.095 2.549
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) 1.357 1.462 1.301 1.419
NPL 1.268 0.935 1.038 0.892
Experiment 4 1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) 1.977 2.035 2.228 0.699
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) 0.906 0.848 1.000 0.850
NPL 0.935 0.884 0.969 0.881
Experiment 5 1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) 6.054 4.459 3.279 2.429
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) 1.146 1.176 1.043 1.130
NPL 1.143 1.250 1.037 1.210
Experiment 6 1-stage (NP freq. ˆ P0) 6.591 5.589 6.072 3.487
1-stage (Logit ˆ P0) 1.162 1.209 1.020 1.166
NPL 1.158 1.248 1.010 1.197
34Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
189 markets. Years 1994-1999
Restaurants Gas stations Bookstores Shoe shops Fish shops
Number of ﬁrms per 10,000 people 14.6 1.0 1.9 0.9 0.7
Markets with 0 ﬁrms 32.2 % 58.6 % 49.5 % 67.1 % 74.1 %
Markets with 1 ﬁrm 1.3 % 15.3 % 15.8 % 10.8 % 9.6 %
Markets with 2 ﬁrms 1.2 % 7.8 % 8.0 % 6.7 % 5.0 %
Markets with 3 ﬁrms 0.5 % 5.2 % 6.9 % 3.8 % 3.4 %
Markets with 4 ﬁrms 1.2 % 4.0 % 3.6 % 2.7 % 2.0 %
Markets with more than 4 ﬁrms 63.5 % 9.2 % 16.2 % 8.9 % 5.9 %
Herﬁndahl Index (median) 0.169 0.738 0.663 0.702 0.725
Annual revenue per ﬁrm (in thousand $) 17.6 67.7 23.3 67.2 124.8
Regression log(1+# ﬁrms) on log(market size)(1) 0.383 0.133 0.127 0.073 0.062
(0.043) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018)
Regression log(ﬁrm size) on log(market size)(2) -0.019 0.153 -0.066 0.223 0.097
(0.034) (0.082) (0.050) (0.081) (0.111)
Entry rate (%)(3) 9.8 14.6 19.7 12.8 21.3
Exit rate (%)(4) 9.9 7.4 13.5 10.4 14.5
Survival rate (Hazard rate): 1 year (%)(5) 86.2 (13.8) 89.5 (10.5) 84.0 (16.0) 86.8 (13.2) 79.7 (20.3)
Survival rate (Hazard rate): 2 years (%) 69.5 (19.5) 88.5 (1.1) 70.0 (16.6) 71.1 (18.2) 58.1 (27.2)
Survival rate (Hazard rate): 3 years (%) 60.1 (14.9) 84.6 (4.3) 60.0 (14.3) 52.6 (25.1) 44.6 (23.3)
Note 1: Market size = Population. Regression included time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note 2: Firm size = Revenue per ﬁrm. Regression included time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note 3: Entry rate = Entrants / Incumbents
Note 4: Exit rate = Exits / Incumbents
Note 5: Survival and hazard rates are calculated using the subsample of new entrants in years 1995 and 1996.
35Table 6
Distribution of the estimated number of potential entrants
Restaurants Gas stations Bookstores Shoe shops Fish shops
Nm =2 63 (33.3 %) 146 (77.3 %) 123 (65.1 %) 153 (81.0 %) 158 (83.6 %)
Nm =3 1 (0.5 %) 9 (4.8 %) 14 (7.4 %) 6 (3.2 %) 6 (3.2 %)
Nm =4 3 (1.6 %) 8 (4.2 %) 10 (5.3 %) 8 (4.2 %) 9 (4.8 %)
Nm =5 1( 0 . 5% ) 8( 4 . 2% ) 5( 2 . 7% ) 5( 2 . 7% ) 2( 1 . 1% )
Nm =6 1( 0 . 5% ) 3( 1 . 6% ) 5( 2 . 7% ) 4( 2 . 1% ) 4( 2 . 1% )
Maximum Nm 105 17 48 16 20
36Table 7
NPL estimation of Entry-Exit model




-9.519 -12.769 -15.997 -14.497 -6.270




1.743 1.929 2.029 2.030 0.914




5.756 10.441 5.620 5.839 4.586




1.643 2.818 1.606 2.724 1.395
(0.176) (0.325) (0.201) (0.316) (0.234)
Std. dev of ωm 1.322 2.029 1.335 2.060 1.880
Number of observations 945 945 945 945 945
R-square: entries 0.298 0.196 0.442 0.386 0.363
R-square: exits 0.414 0.218 0.234 0.221 0.298
Standarized parameters:
(a) exp(−α0 /α 1) 235 750 2658 1267 951
(b) exp(α2 /α 1) 27 224 16 18 151
(c) δ ln(2) /α 1 65.3 % 101.3 % 54.9 % 93.1 % 105.7 %
Note (a): The value exp(−α0/α1) represents the minimum market population size such that variable proﬁts of a monopolist
can cover ﬁxed operating costs.
Note (b): The value exp(α2/α1) represents the minimum market population size such that variable proﬁts of a monopolist
can cover entry sunk costs.
Note (c): The value δ ln(2)/α1 represents the percentage increase in market size such that proﬁts of a duopolist in the
larger market are equal to proﬁts of a monopolist in the smaller market.
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